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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 7269

JOE G. TRUJILLO, also known as
JOE GARCIA TRUJILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant and appellant, Joe Garcia Trujillo, appeals
from a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without
recommendation, entered in the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for Carbon County, Utah. The defendant stood
charged with unlawfully taking the life of Max Lopez on
or about May 26, 1948, in Carbon County,
There was some conflict in the testimony at the trial.
Counsel for the defendant, in his statement of facts, reviewed
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the testimony of each principal witness, indicating these conflicts. However, we feel he has fairly and adequ~tely presented the facts as adduced at the trial, and it would, therefore,
serve no purpose to re-state them here.
The defendant has made thirteen assignments of error.
We shall discuss them in order, though not in each instance
separately.

ARGUMENT
I

THE CONTENTION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
HAD NO JURISDICTION AND THAT THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO FILE THE INFORMATION BECAUSE THE INFORMATION WAS FILED IN A DISRICT COURT BEFORE THE PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE WERE
FILED IS WITHOUT MERIT.
The record shows the following regarding the commitment of the defendant.
~

The preliminary hearing was held June 29th, June 30th,
and July 1st, 1948, (JR, pages 7 and 8). The order of com. mitment was made and signed by the committing magistrate
July 1, 1948, (JR. 3). l'he information was filed in the district
court July 2, 1948, (JR. 9). The transcript of proceedings
before the committing magistrate was signed by the committing
magistrate July 6, 1948. (JR. 8), and the order of commitment
together with the transcript of proceedings before the committing magistrate were actually filed in the district court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
July 6, 1948. The defendant's plea to the information was
made by a motion to quash, entered July 12, 1948. (JR. 11).
Defense counsel contends that the district court acquired
no jurisdiction over the matter until the order of commitment
and the transcript of proceedings before the committing
magistrate were filed in the district court; that the information
was filed by the district attorney prior to the filing of the
order of commitment; that the district court thus had no
jurisdiction, and that the defendant's motion to quash should
have been sustained on grounds two and three contained
therein. (JR. 11) .
The record shows that the order of commitment was
actually made and entered of record by the committing magistrate on July 1, 1948,- (JR. 3).
It is the state's position that the jurisdiction of the district
court attached upon the making and entering of an order of
commitment, and that the subsequent acts of filing the transcript of proceedings before the committing magistrate and the
order of commitment are ministerial acts which, at least in the
absence of prejudicial error, have no effect whatsoever upon
the jurisdiction of the district court or the authority of the
district attorney to file the information therein.
These questions, the validity of the inforn1ation filed in the
district court before the order of commitment, and the jurisdiction of the district court thus acquired, arose in the case
of People v. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 P. 896. The ~upreme
Court of California had this to say:
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((The question * * * is when is the defendant legally
cotnmitted? We think that occurs when the magistrate has acted judicially, and has made and signed the
order of commitment. His judicial functions then
cease, and the return of the depositions and order of
commitment is a mere ministerial duty. In People v.
Wallace, 94 Cal. 499, 29 P. 950 it was said: (It is
doubtless true that the order holding to answer must
be in writing; but when, as a result of an examination,
such an order has in fact been made and entered upon
the docket of the justice, it would seem that no further
action on his part is necessary to authorize the district
attorney to file an information against the defendant
for the offense named in the order.' In that case-as
in the case at bar-the order holding the defendant
to answer before the Supreme Court was entered upon
the justice's docket, but was not endorsed on the complaint or depositions.''
The .California court has consistently held that a motion
to set aside the information on the ground that it was filed
before the record of the preliminary examination and the
order of commitment by the magistrate was received by the
clerk of the district court should be overruled where such
information was filed after the preliminary examination in
fact had been held and the order of commitment had been
made and entered of record by the magistrate and where prior
to the trial the record of t.he preliminary examination and the
order of commitment are duly filed with the clerk of the
district court. People v. Bettencouft, 64 Cal. App. 243, 221
P. 403. People v. Sacramento Butchers Protective Ass'n. et. al.,
12 Cal. App. 471, 107 P. 712, 716, People v. ~' 28 Cal.
App. 766, 154 P. 34.
~
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Furthermore, this rule has been followed elsewhere. In
the case of Williarns et. id. l'. Stt:~te. 6 Okla. Cr. 373, 118 P.
1006, 1007, the court stated that:
~]t

is the fact that there was a prelin1inary exan1ination
or a waiver thereof and a judicial determination thereon
by the examining magistrate that a felony has been
committed and that there is probable cause to believe
the defendant guilty thereof, that authorizes the county
attorney to file an information in the district court
charging the crime committed according to the facts
in evidence on such examination or for the offense
charged in the preliminary information when such examination has been waived by the defendant, and such
an adjudication is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon
the district court."
The cases of People v. Thompson, 84 CaL 598, 24 P. 384,
and People v. Bomar, 73 Cal. App. 372, 238 P. 758 are distinguishable under the rule cited above, in that the order of
commitment in each case was itself defective. There is nothing
in the case at bar which indicates any defect in the order of
commitment itself.
Counsel for the defendant urges that the California
statutes are distinguishable from those of this state. A comparison of section 105-15-19 Utah Code Annotated 1943, and
California Penal Code section 872 will show that they are
practically identical. Defense counsel attempts to distinguish
them in their headings, but it will be noted that headings to
sections of the Utah Code are not a part of the legislative
enactment but rather are merely editorial.
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Defense counsel further contends that the phrase !(as
provided in this code" from section 105-17-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943, means ((that all acts required to be done by the
committing magistrate must be done to confer jurisdiction on
the district court." (Appellant's brief P. 16). With that
general proposition we have no quarrel. However, it is our
position that when the committing magistrate made and entered
the order of commitment, he exercised the judicial function
which conferred jurisdiction on the district court under the
provision of 105-17-1; the subsequent filing of the order and
transcript of proceedings with the clerk of the distri~t court
was ministerial merely, and the district attorney had authority
to file the information. The acts precedent to the conferring
of jurisdiction on the district court-the making of the order
of committment, reducing it to writing and its signature by
the committing magistrate-were all done July 1, 1948, one
day prior to the filing of the information.
The order of commitment is regular on its face (JR. 3).
The transcript of proceedings before the magistrate shows that:
((The Court found that the offense of Murder in the
First Degree had been committed; that there was sufficient cause to believe the Defendant, Joe G. Trujillo,
also known as Joe Garcia Trujillo, guilty thereof; and
it was ordered by the Court that said Defendant be
held to answer to said charge; and that he be committed to the Sheriff of Carbon County without bail."
(JR. 8, italics added).
It is true that the affidavit of the magistrate (JR. 50)
indicates that the order of commitment was not actually
prepared and signed in the presence of the defendant. It does
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indicate that this was done later on the same day, July 1, 1948.
However, the affiant does state uThat at the conclusion of
the preliminary hearing as aforesaid affiant herein made an
Order holding the defendant for trial in the District Court
on the offense set forth in the Complaint on file in the City
Court of Price, Utah." (J.R. 50). The order was made nat
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing," and it is submitted
that the reduction to writing is ministerial. If this delay
in reducing the order of commitment to writing be error,
there is nothing in the record to show that the rights of
defendant were prejudiced thereby, and as set forth above,
such error would not be jurisdictional.
Defense counsel's entire argument under points one and
two of his brief shows nothing that was prejudicial to the
rights of the defendant. Nor does the record indicate that
the defendant was prejudiced in any manner by the procedure
followed in making the order of commitment and in filing
the information. Section 105-43-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943,
provides as follows:
((After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment
without regard to errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error
has been committed, it shall not be presumed to have
resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied
that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing
the judgment."
It is submitted that the defendant has shown nothing, in
or out of the record, that would indicate prejudice to the defendant in any manner by the method used in his commitment
and the filing of the information.
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II

THE TRIAL COURT, IN INSTRUCTION NO. 2,
PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN MURDER IN
THE FIRST AND SECOND DEG~EES.
In its instruction on murder in the first degree, the trial
court submitted two theories to the jury:
((. * * * the slayer must before the commission of the
act or acts resulting in the death of the deceased have
deliberately and premeditatedly formed a specific intention or design to kill the person slain; or, must have
deliberately and premeditatedly formed a specific intention or design to kill another and · in the attempt
to kill such intended victim kill the person slain instead." (JR. 15 italics added).
The court then instructed on the element of time for reflection
and consideration prior to delivering the fatal blow.
In paragraph 5 of instruction No. 2, which instructs on
·murder in the second degree, the trial court stated that the
jury must, in order to find the defendant guilty of murder in
the second degree, find that:

(( * * *

The slayer before the commission of the
act resulting in death has a specific design or intention
thought out before hand to cause great bodily injury
to the deceased, or an intention or design thought out
beforehand to do an act knowing the reasonable and
natural consequences thereof would be likely to cause
great bodily injury to the deceased." (JR. 16).
The instruction on murder in the first degree contains
the words ((deliberately" and premeditatedly;" the instruction
on murder in the second degree does not.
the instruction defines these words:

Paragraph 2 of
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* * * The tern1S, taforethought, pren1editation, and
deliberation' mean to think out, plan, or design beforehand. The term (deliberation,' has the additional
quality or meaning of planning or designing in a cool
state of the blood or mind.'' (JR. 15).
n

We submit that the trial court adequately distinguished
between murder in the first degree and murder in the second
degree. State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P. (2d) 1005, and
Stater. Thonzpson, 110 U. 113, 170 P. (2d) 153.
III

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IN THAT IT DID NOT INSTRUCT
ON ttMALICE AFORETHOUGHT," OR ttMINIMIZE THE
REQUIREMENT OF PLANNING, DESIGNING, OR
THINKING OUT BEFOREHAND."
Defense counsel urges that the instruction tn the first
paragraph of instruction No. 6 is erroneous in that it does
not spell out the equivalent of ttmalice aforethought," that it
''minimizes the requirement of planning, designing and thinking out beforehand." (Appellant's brief p. 24).
It will be noted that the second and third paragraphs
of instruction No. 2 (JR. 15) define aforethought, premeditation, deliberation, and malice, and that these definitions are
clear and complete. In those paragraphs the requirement of
planning, designing and thinking out of the homicide is
thoroughly set out.
We believe the rule to be that jury instructions must be
construed as a whole, and if, construed all together, they give
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the necessary elements of the crime, then it is not error that
one instruction taken alone, is not complete. State v. Evans,
107 U. 1, 151 P (2d) 196, 198.

IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT, IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF INSTRUCTION NO. 6, LEAVE THE JURY
TO DECIDE ON ANY THEORY OF THE EVIDENCE.
The paragraph in question is quoted:
((OR. If, from any theory of the evidence in this
case your minds are satisfied beyond all reasonable
doubt that the defendant fired one or more shots into
the body of Max Lopez and that before doing so he
formed a design or intent wilfully, deliberately, and
premeditatedly to kill either of the persons there pres.ent
and that such shot or shots were fired pursuant to such
intent and that a wound or wounds inflicted from the
firing of any shot or shots so fired caused or contributed
to the death of Max Lopez, then you should find by
your verdict that the defendant is guilty of murder
in the first degree." (JR 22).
It will be noted that, in the second paragraph of instruction
No. 2, (JR 15) the court submitted to th~ jury two theories,
or as they are designated in the Russell case, supra, categories
for murder in the first degree - deliberate, premeditated,
specific intent to kill the particular person slain, or deliberate,
premeditated, specific intent to kill another, in the attempt
of which the particular person slain is killed. The last paragraph of instruction No. 6 combines these in the words ttto
kill either of the persons there present.''
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It is submitted that the phrase, ((any theory of the evidence," is limited by that which follows in the quoted paragraph. Further, under the rule that jury instructions are
to be construed as a whole, State v. Evans, supra, this phrase
is limited by the second paragraph of instruction No. 2, and
its use is not prejudicial error.

v
UNDER THE RULE THAT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ARE TO BE CONSTRUED l\S A WHOLE, THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS SPECIFIC
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE DEGREES OF HOMICIDE.
Defendant's assignments of error Numbers VI, VII, and
VIII are based on the theory that an instruction on one element
or another is omitted in the specific instructions on murder
in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary
manslaughter. That is, defense counsel urges that in the
specific instructions, wherein the law is applied to the evidence
adduced on the trial, the court in each instruction must set
forth all essential elements of the particular offense on which
it is instructing. We do not take this to be so.
Instruction No. 2 (JR. 15, 16, 17) is the general instruction on murder in the first degree and included offenses. We
believe that this instruction spells out the essential elements
of each offense, and that, when read in connection with the
specific instructions Numbers 7, 8 and 9, which apply the
law of the included offenses-murder in the second degree,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter-to the
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evidence in the case, the jury was properly instructed, and no
error was committed. Instructions to the jury must be considered as a whole. State v. Evans} supra.

VI
THE COURT COMMITT'ED NO ERROR IN .ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EFFECT OF INTOXICATION.
Defense counsel assigns as error the fact that the trial
court, in instruction No. 12, did not include a separate paragraph instructing on intoxication in connection with voluntary
manslaughter.
It will be noted that the court did instruct regarding
the consideration to be given intoxication where the actual
existence of intent is necessary to a crime.
((But, whenever the actual existence of any particular
motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute
any particular species or degree of crime you may take
into consideration the fact, if it is shown to be a fact,
that the defendant was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he
committed the act." (Instr. 12, JR. 29, italics added).
The trial court then instructed specifically on intoxication in
connection with murder in the first and second degrees.
We submit that the instruction quoted above, together
with the general instruction on voluntary manslaughter contained in instruction No. 2, (JR. 16) sufficed.
Defense counsel also assigns as error the fact that the
trial court, in its instruction on intoxication, · did not instruct
on .premeditation and deliberation.
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In the first paragraph of instruction No. 12, (JR. 29)
the trial court, in instructing on intoxication in connection: :
.
with murdet; in the first degree, used the phrase, ~~to think
out and form the specific design or intent to take the life
of Max Lopez." In the second paragraph, instructing on intoxication in connection with murder in the second degree,
the trial court used the phrases, (Ito form a design," and nto
form an intention or design thought out beforehand."
In instruction No. 2, the trial court defined, among other
terms, the words ((premeditation" and ((deliberation," stating
that these terms ({mean to think out, plan or design beforehand.'' We submit that when these instructions are read
together, the jury is properly instructed concerning the ability
to deliberate, meditate, and form an intent to kill when the
defendant is intoxicated.

VII
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTION OF A FELONY.
Defense counsel further urges error by the trial court,
in its instruction on evidence of prior conviction (Instruction
No. 19, JR. 36). The instruction is as follows:
has been elicited from the Defendant to
the effect that he has prior hereto been convicted of
a felony. You are instructed that such evidence should
be considered by you only so far. as it may affect the
credibility of the Defendant as a witness in his own
behalf.n (Italics added).
~~Evidence
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Defense counsel cites as error the failure of the trial
court to instruct that prior conviction of a crime is not evidence of guilt, and to define credibility.
We respectfully submit that the portion of the instruction
italicised above sufficiently limits the jury in its consideration
of the evidence of prior conviction of the defendant.
Counsel cites no authority which requires a definition
of credibility be given, and we have found none. We believe
the trial court need not define every material word in an
instruction, that the court need · not define credibility, and
that the above quoted instruction is accurate and complete.

VIII
DEFENDANT"S RIGHTS WERE IN NOWAY PREJUDICED BY THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN INTERPRETER
IN THE TRIAL.
Defense counsel assigns as error the facts (a) that the
court did not control and supervise the interpreter, (b) that
the court did not instruct the interpreter properly, (c) that
the court did not control counsel in their employment of the
interpreter, and (d) that the court did not dispense with the
services of the interpreter during the direct and cross examination of the witness, Herrera.
We shall first consider the contention that the court
should have dispensed with the services of the interperter
during the examination of the witness, Herrera. We preface
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our argument with a citation to an annotation nlJse of Interpreter in Court Proceedings,, 172 A. L. R. 923, which presents
a rather thorough and complete discussion of the cases on the
subject. The need for use of an interpreter in a trial rests
in the sound discretion of the trial court. Annotation 172
A. L. R. 930, and cases there cited. This is the rule also where
the witness speaks ~~broken English.'' This rule is based on
the principle that the trial court, being present and observing
the witnesses, is in a better position than a court of review
to judge whether or not an interpreter is needed, and if so
to what extent his use is nece~sary.
In the case of People v. Santos 7 134 Cal. App. 736, 26
P. (2d) 522, where the accused was charged with the crime
of rape and an interpreter was used for one of the state's
v1itnesses, the court stated:
''The further claim is made that the trial court erred
when it ordered an interpreter for the witness Enriquita Valenzuela. It is stated that said witness testified in English before the grand jury, wrote letters
in English, and on the trial volunteered certain answers
in English. The record on appeal discloses neither
the testimony of the witness before the grand jury nor
any letters written by the witness. It does app~ar that
on the trial the witness answered certain simple questions without the aid of the interpreter by saying, 'Yes'
or 'Si.' But even assuming that the witness could read,
write, and speak some English, it does not appear that
the trial court abused its disc.retion in ordering an interpreter. The propriety of calling an interpreter is
a question addressed to the discretion of the trial couri
and its action will not be distttrbed unless it clearly
appears that such discretion has been abused. People
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v. Lecang, 213 Cal. 65, 1 P. (2d) 7; 8 Cal. Jur. 225.
There are authorities indicating that it may be an abuse
of discretion to refuse to call an interpreter under some
circumstances, but our attention has not been called
to any case in which it has been held to be an abuse of
discretion to call a properly qualified interpreter."
(Italics added) .
In the case of People v. Lecang, 213 Cal. 65, 1 P. (2d)
7, a prosecution for murder, wherein a witness began testifying
in English and later an interpreter was employed in order to
facilitate matters, the court held that this was a valid exercise
of the discretion of the court and did not prejudice the interests
of the defendant. On this point, the court stated as follows:
' (It is equally clear that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in permitting the witness
Emoto to testify through an interpreter. His examination was commenced without an interpreter, and
though he understood English to quite an extent, it
soon became apparent that the calling of an interpreter would facilitate matters, as it later proved. This
was a nzatter tvithin the discretion of the trial court,
and to our mind the record shows that here there waJ
a wise use rather than an abuse of such discretion."
(Italics added) .
The exercise of· this discretion is subject to appellate
review, 172 A. L. R. 932, and the appellate court may consider
the witness' testimony from the record to decide the question
of abuse of discretion. 172 A. L. R. 934. However, in order
to reverse on the grounds of abuse of discretionary powers,
there must be a positive showing of prejudicial error. That
is, it must be shown that the party complaining was injured
thereby. In the case of State v. Inich, 55 Mont. 1, 173 P. 230,
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234, in a prosecution for n1urder wherein an interpreter was
used, the Montana court stated:
nThe statute (section 7894, Rev. Codes) provides,
(When a witness does not understand and speak the
English language, an interpreter must be sworn to
interpret for him.' Whether an interpreter is necessaty
for a particular witness must be determined by the trial
court_. and its conclusion is not subject to review by
this court except fot· a manifest and gross abuse of
discretion. People v. Salas, 2 Cal. App. 539, 84 Pac.
295; People v. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 535, 38 Am. Rep. 73.
Even so error in this particular will not justify. setting
aside a conviction fully sustained by the evidence, when
the defendant has apparently suffered no prejudice by
reason of it. Of course, as counsel say, an interpreter
should not be called if the witness can understand and
answer the questions put to hin1. But it is often the
case that a person who understands and speaks with
reasonable ease the language of the street or of ordinary
business encounters difficulty and embarrassment when
subjected to examination as a witness during proceedings in court. As we read the record, such seems
to have been the case with the witness here. We
therefore do not think the court manifestly in error
in calling the interpreter.'' (Italics added) .
In the case of State v. Lee1 116 La. 607, 40 So. 914, the court
held that, the defense counsel having accepted an interpreter
and the interpreter having served throughout the trial without
objection, the defense could not then be heard to object to
the appointment of the interpreter.
It is submitted that the record in the instant case shows
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the use of the interpreter for the witness, Herrera. It is true, as indicated in
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the defendant's brief (p. 41) that the witness, Herrera, understood some English. However, the extent of his knowledge
and command of the English language is not shown in the
record.
At no time during the trial of the cause did counsel for
the defendant object to the use of an interpreter or of this
particular interpreter. On the contrary, at least twice in the
trial when the witness replied in English, defense counsel
urged him to reply in Spanish. (R. 59, 65). Furthermore,
the witness indicated on cross-examination that he was confused,
and answered incorrectly at the inquest, where he had no
interpreter. (R. 123).
The interpreter '\\Tas used from the beginning of the
direct examination of the witness, Herrera, with no objections
from defense counsel. We submit that, in order to obtain
a reversal for the use of an interpreter where it is claimed
he is incompetent, counsel must make a definite objection to
a selection or continuance of that interpreter. This question
arose in the case of State v. Sauer, 217 Min. 591, 15 N.W. (2d)
17, and the court stated as follows:
(Defendant insists that a new trial should have been
granted on the ground that it was error to permit
Florence Jakkula, the executive secretary of the county
welfare board, to act as interpreter, in that she was
interested in the case and did not interpret fairly and
impartially. The decision of the competency of an
interpreter rests in the sound discretion of the court.
No objection was made to her appointment nor to
her continuing to act. Near the very close of the case,
when the state was offering rebuttal testimony, counsel
c
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for defendant stated: ] insist in order to have regularity here that they use this interpreter as long as
they have her here., The trial court found no basis
for considering seriously the objection now being made
to the interpreter, and we find none."
Defendant contends Hthat the whole examination and
cross examination of the witness is impeded, dulled and made
inaccurate when had through interpretation." ·However unfortunate, the use of interpreters is sometimes necessary, and
express provision is made for their service by statute. 105-46-7
Utah Code Annotated 1943. The trial court apparently felt
the necessity in this case. Counsel must also have felt the
necessity. Nowhere in the record did counsel for the state or
for the defendant object to the use of an interpreter. Nowhere
in the record did either counsel object to the use of the particular interpreter. Defense counsel expressly approved the
service of this particular interpreter (R. 4) and raised no objection to his serving during examination of the witness Herrera.
With defense counsel's claim of error by the trial court
!Cin permitting the interpreter to dictate, dominate, control,
intrude or participate in the examination of the witnesses and
proceedings of the court," we respectfully disag.ree.
We submit first that no objection to the procedure followed
was raised by defense counsel on the trial. On the contrary,
several times defense counsel engaged in conversation with
the interpreter (R. 124, 163, 169) and in directing questions
to the interpreter. (R. 134, 135, 136).
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We further submit that the interpreter did not c (dictate,
dominate, control, intrude or participate" in the trial. The
entire problem of translating is most difficult, and the interpreter appreciated this (R. 138, 150, 153). As a matter of
fact, the record shows a sincere effort by the interpreter to
do a complete and accurate job of translating ideas (R. 138,
150, 15 3), and an effort on his part to get an accurate statement of the questions from counsel before putting them to the
witness. (R. 118, 119, 120).
Whether or not the interpreter dictated, dominated, controlled, intruded or participated in the trial in such manner
as to constitute error can be determined only by a careful consideration of the entire record. It is our position that he did
not; that the record shows he did not; that on the contrary,
the record shows a careful and thorough job of interpreting,
and nowhere does it show that defendant was prejudiced in
the interpretation.
Defendant, in his motion for a new trial, set forth nothing
indicating error by the court regarding the use and conduct
of the interpreter except, perhaps, the general allegation
Ctthat the court * * * has done and allowed acts in the trial
of said action that are prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the defendant.'' (JR. 49). Nothing is set forth regarding
the appointment, employment, or conduct of the interpreter.
In the case of State v. Cabodi, 18 N. M. 513, 138 P. 262,
cited and quoted in Annotation 172 A.L.R. 923, 952, the court
in considering what is required for granting a new trial on
grounds of misinterpretation, stated:
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((Upon the trial no objection was interposed by appellant to the interpretation of the evidence, and in
the motion for new trial no attempt was made to show
that the interpretation \Yas incorrect by affidavit or
otherwise, except the mere allegation of such fact in
the motion. The trial court decided the question
adversely to appellant, by a denial of the motion, and
this court cannot go into the question of fact as to
whether the interpretation vvas, or was not literal. The
record fails to disclose any inability of the interpreter,
or that the interpretation was not literal. In such a
case where it appears that the complaining party is
aware at the time that the interpretation of the evidence
is not correct, it is incumbent upon hi~ to call the
court's attention to such erroneous translation and ask
to have it corrected, and where he has not such knowledge at the tin1e, but afterward becomes aware of the
fact, he must set out all the facts in his motion for
a new trial, pointing out therein specifically the evidence erroneously translated, and support such contention by affidavit of proof, so that the trial court can
intelligently pass upon the question."
We believe this rule should apply generally to objections to
appointment and conduct of an interpreter.

The record does not show that formal instruction by the
court was given to the interpreter. , On the other hand, the
record shows no objection by counsel for the state or for the
defendant on this ground. Furthermore, the record we submit,
shows no prejudicial error because of the lack of such instruction, and we believe that this matter is therefore not subject
to review.
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There being nothing in the record showing abuse or discretion or prejudicial error by the trial court in selection, use,
or conduct of the interpreter, those assignments of error are,
we submit, groundless.

IX
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT.

This court has said that it is not its province, on appeal
from a conviction of a crime, to judge credibility of witnesses
whose testimony conflicts, but that the court is concerned only
with questions of sufficiency of the .evidence to sustain the
conviction. State v. Laub, 102 U. 402, 131 P (2d) 805,
State v. Aures, 102 U. 113, 127 P (2d) 872.
We agree that there is conflict in the evidence. Defense
counsel urges that ttthe testimony of the defendant provides
the only clear and complete version of the incident that reconciles every inconsistent aspect," (Def.'s brief 50) and tiThe
testimony of the defendant is direct, clear, complete, logical
and inclusive on all points." (Def.'s brief p. 51). It is
further urged that the other witness' testimony is ttof doubtful
probative value,'' because they were drunk, had an interest
in the matter, or their testimony conflicted in some aspect. We
submit that it is the province of the jury to determine credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence.
The court submitted the case to the jury on two theories
as set out in title 103-28-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943:
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nEvery n1urder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait,
or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and
premeditated killing; * * * or perpetrated fron1 a
premeditated design unlawfully and malicious! y to
effect the death of any human being other than the
one who is killed; * * * is murder in the first degree."
(See par. 3, instruction 2, JR. 15, and related instructions.)
The evidence would appear to clearly support either theory.
The testimony for the State is lengthy; little purpose
could be served by setting it forth here. It will be noted that
this alleged error was one of the grounds for motion for a new
trial (JR. 49). Apparently it was argued to the trial co~rt,
and that court saw no basis for it. We submit that the evidence
amply supported the verdict.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the record shows the trial
court had jurisdiction of the offense as set out in the information; it committed no error in its charge to the jury; it committed
no error in the selection and employment of an interpreter
on the trial; and that the evidence adduced on the trial amply
supported the verdict. The defendant had a speedy and fair
trial; his rights were not prejudiced, and the verdict should
not be upset.
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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